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Re: [tor-bugs] #21295 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow mixed anonymous and non-anonymous onion services in the same tor instance



#21295: Allow mixed anonymous and non-anonymous onion services in the same tor
instance
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  teor                                 |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion, prop224,       |  Actual Points:
  maybe-bad-idea                                 |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  2
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I just don't think this is safe, particularly as part of Tor's current
 design.

 We are adding vanguards to make onion services harder to discover.
 And we want to reject connections to HSDir, intro, and rendezvous points
 where there is a client directly connected on both sides.

 If someone does want to give up their anonymity, they should run another
 tor instance, or restart their current instance in non-anonymous mode.

 Or we should develop a feature where controllers can set custom onion
 service paths.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21295#comment:9>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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