Re: [tor-bugs] #15618 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending)

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as
rendevous (pending)
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs needs-insight needs-          |  Actual Points:
  diagnosis                                      |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by s7r):

 I agree that the message is annoying and so so heavily logged especially
 on high consensus weight Exits.

 I do not see it on middle relays, however, which should obviously mean
 something since we are talking about REND circuits that are supposed to
 not use relays with Exit flag.

 Back to the subject, I am still interested in what causes this, as it
 might help us improve performance. I have been running an Exit for a very,
 very long time, and this warning started to appear after heavy work /
 improvements were done for v2 onion services (like retry introduction
 points on circuit fail, rotate randomly after n INTROUCE2, etc). Somewhere
 there's a tiny thing which triggers this, and while it's obviously not
 critical since it's been going on for so long time and nothing melted, it
 might add extra load or downgrade efficiency, so it's worth fixing it.

 If the resolution here is to downgrade this to protocol warning, I am OK
 with it, but I'd leave this ticket open as I am willing to do more digging
 here. Maybe even run some custom branches that log the entire rendezvous
 dance, or run the patches on Tor instances hosting onion services
 directly.

 My main argument to try to get to the bottom of this ticket is that I am
 afraid the warnings are also v3 onion services related and we really do
 care about these, I could care less if it only triggered on v2 which we
 plan to slowly deprecate.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15618#comment:54>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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