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Re: [tor-bugs] #6297 [Tor Client]: SOCKS issues with bitcoin in .2.3.18-rc vs .2.2.37
#6297: SOCKS issues with bitcoin in .2.3.18-rc vs .2.2.37
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Reporter: jrmithdobbs | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: needs_information
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Tor Client | Version: Tor: 0.2.3.18-rc
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by jrmithdobbs):
The rfc is very vague in this area. It pretty much skips over validation
completely (outside of auth) as far as I can tell.
As far as the security, after actually looking at your parser I'm much
less concerned about that. However, I still think there may be an issue
regarding an attacker that has the ability to inject but not necessarily
intercept the original message.
For example, because of how it's parsed so long as you can successfully
get your packets accepted (there's been various recent talks/papers re:
inadequacy of syn cookies as it relates to this) it could be feasible to
force a user's connection to a specific username/password for the socks
connection which may affect how the connection is isolated vs their other
connections and may provide a way for an inject-capable (no observation of
traffic between the client and socks port needed, really) to be able to
associate a client's connections that should, by the configuration, be
isolated.
Does that help make more sense of my concerns?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6297#comment:9>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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