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[tor-bugs] #9273 [Tor]: Brainstorm tradeoffs from moving to 2 (or even 1) guards
#9273: Brainstorm tradeoffs from moving to 2 (or even 1) guards
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Reporter: arma | Owner:
Type: project | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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There are now many conflicting issues to consider when changing the
default number of guards. I'd like to write a proposal suggesting we move
to 2 (or even 1), but I don't think I'm ready to write the analysis
section yet.
Here's a start:
Pro 1: Reduces chance of using an adversary's guard. This argues for 1,
but 2 would still be a lot better. See Tariq's WPES 2012 paper for
details.
Pro 2: Reduces impact from guard fingerprinting: if the adversary learns
that you have the following n guards, and later sees an anonymous user
with the same guards, how likely is it to be you? Said another way, a trio
of guards produces a cubic, whereas a duo of guards produces a quadratic.
Somebody should do the math to sort out the chance of having all possible
trios of guards, followed by the expected uniqueness of a trio. I expect
moving to 2 gives the majority of the benefit here.
Con 1: Increases the variance of performance. The more guards you have,
the closer to average performance you'll be. Whereas if you have just one
guard, your performance will be impacted a lot by that choice. It would
seem that we need to raise the bar on getting the Guard flag if we move
people to having just one guard.
Con 2: Moving to 1 guard will rule out a Conflux-style design. But 2
guards would still work fine.
What did I miss?
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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9273>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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