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Re: [tor-bugs] #8240 [Tor]: Raise our guard rotation period, if appropriate
#8240: Raise our guard rotation period, if appropriate
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Reporter: arma | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: assigned
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
Component: Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.7
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-client, needs-proposal,
Actual Points: | 023-backport, unfrozen, 027-triaged-1-in,
Points: medium | SponsorU
| Parent ID:
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Comment (by arma):
Replying to [comment:50 asn]:
> OTOH, a 9 month rotation period gives us about 10 years before we have
50% prob of being unsafe, and 4.5 years before we have 25% probability of
being unsafe. This seems like a pretty big safety guarantee compared to
the rest of the security of Tor.
My research director hat hasn't been fitting on my head lately, so I bet
this is actually answered in one of our tech reports and I just don't
remember, but: it seems likely to me that natural network churn will have
a big impact once we're looking at such large timescales. That is, the
safety does not scale up linearly with the rotation period. I think some
of the COGS paper and graphs were aiming to measure how it diverges.
It would be great for all of us to have better intuition on what levels of
safety are possible on the real network (with its natural churn). My
current guess is that moving to a 9 month rotation period doesn't actually
give us much more than a 5 month rotation period (at least not reliably)
-- but I'd like to be arguing based on facts rather than guesses.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8240#comment:51>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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