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Re: [tor-bugs] #22791 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop 224 encrypted public key
#22791: Prop 224 encrypted public key
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Reporter: Dbryrtfbcbhgf | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: closed
Priority: High | Milestone: Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution: invalid
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by dgoulet):
* status: new => closed
* resolution: => invalid
Comment:
There seems to be many confusion here.
The `HS-DESC-FIRST-LAYER` is not encrypted differently per client. If you
don't know the onion address, you can't log the ciphertext _from_ the
descriptor because you can't get it in the first place without the onion
address. So the attackers move here is to run a bunch of HSDir and log all
ciphertext it sees. But because that ciphertext is always the same, I
don't see how you would correlate this with the number of clients
visiting...? You can do that by counting the number of descriptor request
you get for that descriptor and extrapolating by 3 (because 3 directories
by default).
Furthermore, that layer *IS* padded but it is ultimately to hide if a
onion address is using client authorization and the number of introduction
points. See section 2.5.1.1.:
{{{
Before encryption the plaintext is padded with NUL bytes to the nearest
multiple of 10k bytes.
}}}
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22791#comment:1>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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