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[tor-bugs] #22931 [Core Tor/Tor]: What happens when a VERSIONS cell is sent outside a handshake?
#22931: What happens when a VERSIONS cell is sent outside a handshake?
------------------------------+------------------------------
Reporter: teor | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Keywords: doc tor-spec
Actual Points: | Parent ID: #18856
Points: | Reviewer:
Sponsor: |
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The spec really doesn't say:
{{{
To determine the version, in any connection where the "renegotiation"
or "in-protocol" handshake was used (that is, where the responder
sent only one certificate at first and where the initiator did not
send any certificates in the first negotiation), both parties MUST
send a VERSIONS cell. In "renegotiation", they send a VERSIONS cell
right after the renegotiation is finished, before any other cells are
sent. In "in-protocol", the initiator sends a VERSIONS cell
immediately after the initial TLS handshake, and the responder
replies immediately with a VERSIONS cell. Parties MUST NOT send any
other cells on a connection until they have received a VERSIONS cell.
The payload in a VERSIONS cell is a series of big-endian two-byte
integers. Both parties MUST select as the link protocol version the
highest number contained both in the VERSIONS cell they sent and in the
versions cell they received. If they have no such version in common,
they cannot communicate and MUST close the connection. Either party
MUST
close the connection if the versions cell is not well-formed (for
example,
if it contains an odd number of bytes).
}}}
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22931>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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