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Re: [tor-bugs] #26551 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Tor Launcher shows up "missing PT" box but when I click on OK everything starts up and works
#26551: Tor Launcher shows up "missing PT" box but when I click on OK everything
starts up and works
---------------------------------------+--------------------------
Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: brade
Type: defect | Status: assigned
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Launcher | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: ff60-esr | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by ProTipGuyFWIWWeLoveARMA):
My intuition says that this is probably caused by (though not a bug in)
SelfRando as I can't reproduce it on a ff60-esr Nightly before SelfRando
came in. Can anyone corroborate this?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26551#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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[tor-bugs] #26680 [- Select a component]: t that hidden service for as long as possible, so there's still going to be long-term storage somewhere in the chain. Putting it in the directories would mean that as many client as possible could be notified of the hidden service's revocation, even long after the initial revocation is published, in cases where the hidden service operator is unwilling or unable to continue to announce the revocation. Consider that for long-validity revocations, there would actually be less load placed on the network than for a regular short term descriptor. The hidden service would not need to frequently publish a new descriptor about itself. Once a client knows a hidden service is revoked, they do not need to ask about it again. Old revocations could conceivably be stored to disk. The need to revoke hidden service keys is real. It doesn't take long to dig up anecdotes and news reports of .onion sites that have been compromised, but even when detected there is no reliable way for a legitimate hidden service operator to notify the network his service cannot be trusted. Detecting if someone has stolen your hidden service key is easy and is hijacking your traffic is easy, you only have to look out for hidden service descriptors for your service that you did not publish, but there is currently not much that can be done with this information. The hidden service operator could include a notice on his hidden website warning of the compromise and telling users to divert to a different .onion address, but a user has no way of knowing if that warning was published by the attacker and directs to another malicious site. On 2015-03-03 5:19 AM, Donncha O'Cearbhaill wrote: > Alternatively the original hidden service operator could publish hidden > service descriptors with a normal validity period which contain a > revocation field. A HSDir which receives a descriptor containing the > revocation could replace the (potentially malicious) HS descriptor > stored in its cache. > > A client could be show an alert that the hidden service they are > attempting to access has been compromised
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