[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #20742 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement stealth client authorization
#20742: prop224: Implement stealth client authorization
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: asn | Owner: asn
Type: enhancement | Status:
| assigned
Priority: Very High | Milestone: Tor:
| unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: prop224, needs-proposal, | Actual Points:
prop224-extra, tor-hs, client-authorization, |
stealth-authorization, term-project, |
035-removed, hs-auth |
Parent ID: | Points: 3
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
| SponsorR-can
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by asn):
Replying to [comment:17 cypherpunks]:
> hi, as a hsdir for a client, i can watch onion address request? but if
unique onion address for each authorized client exists, i know it is the
same client again. since no other would request it :( ? or do i
misunderstood the spec
Correct.
Usually the individual onions of a stealth HS are not known to the
attacker and are only known to the individual users, so an HSDir is not
able to distinguish a normal onion from a stealth onion used by just one
client.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20742#comment:18>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs