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Re: [tor-bugs] #3375 [Tor Client]: NEWNYM does not abandon open rendezvous circuits
#3375: NEWNYM does not abandon open rendezvous circuits
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Reporter: rransom | Owner: rransom
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.1.x-final
Component: Tor Client | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Changes (by arma):
* priority: critical => major
Comment:
Replying to [comment:4 nickm]:
> Replying to [comment:3 rransom]:
> > A rendezvous circuit's `timestamp_dirty` is reset every time a stream
is attached to it,
>
> Ow. This gives timestamp_dirty a different meaning for rendezvous
circuits than for general circuits, where (unless I'm mistaken) only the
first stream getting attached causes the circuit timestamp_dirty to get
set.
Correct. The idea was that the rendezvous process is expensive, so as long
as you're still interacting with the hidden service, we should make it
over the same circuit.
Because we don't rotate circuits every 10 minutes for hidden services, a)
interactions are faster and smoother, and b) interactions are more
linkable.
> > so this change would only cause clients to reintroduce to a hidden
service if they had a long-lived stream open and had not opened a new
stream to the HS in the last 10 minutes. (If they don't have a long-lived
stream open, Tor will currently close the circuit 10 minutes after the
last time a stream was attached to it) I don't see a problem with using a
new circuit in that case, and it may be beneficial (e.g. for reliability
reasons).
>
> I think that's _probably_ ok too, but it's definitely a behavior change,
and as such I'm not too thrilled about having it in 0.2.1.x.
It is definitely a behavior change. But I pondered the patch for a while
and I think it should be ok to apply, either to 0.2.1 directly or to 0.2.2
with plans to backport 'sometime'.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3375#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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