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Re: [tor-bugs] #3375 [Tor Client]: NEWNYM does not abandon open rendezvous circuits
#3375: NEWNYM does not abandon open rendezvous circuits
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Reporter: rransom | Owner: rransom
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.1.x-final
Component: Tor Client | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by rransom):
Replying to [comment:7 arma]:
> Replying to [comment:3 rransom]:
> > Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
> > > Is changing circuit_is_acceptable sufficient? That is, will the
having this circuit present but non-usable cause new introduction attempts
to be made correctly, or will new attempts to connect to the hidden
service fail while it's around?
> >
> > When I tested this patch, a new attempt to connect to a hidden service
after NEWNYM succeeded (in refetching the descriptor, reintroducing to the
HS, and building and using a second rendezvous circuit).
>
> Did you test it with a stream open during the newnym?
Yes. I opened one stream to an IRC hidden service, sent `SIGNAL NEWNYM`
to the control port, and then opened another stream to the same hidden
service; I read the control-port event logs produced by `SETEVENTS SIGNAL
STREAM CIRC` carefully, and then verified that I had two circuits open to
the same hidden service using `GETINFO circuit-status`.
I also performed the same test without this patch, and that version of Tor
sent the stream opened after `NEWNYM` over the previously existing
rendezvous circuit (and did not build a second rendezvous circuit).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3375#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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