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Re: [tor-bugs] #5979 [Tor Hidden Services]: Tor hidden services can be censored with (D)DoS attacks
#5979: Tor hidden services can be censored with (D)DoS attacks
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Tor Hidden Services | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Changes (by arma):
* priority: blocker => normal
* component: Tor Client => Tor Hidden Services
Comment:
When you say 'blocker', what do you suggest that it block?
This is not a 'bug' so much as a missing design. There are two phases to
fixing it.
First, the easier one, is to look at the various parameters we've picked
(how many intro points, how many requests allowed, what sort of timeout,
etc etc) and see if they're good parameters in practice. Probably most of
them aren't. Then see if they should adapt under attack (and also consider
messy things like anonymity effects of adapting under attack). I suggest
getting your Tor network running under Shadow or ExperimenTor to get a
good handle on the big picture.
The second phase is to take a step back and see if better designs would
provide better resistance to attack.
You may find http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#valet:pet2006 or
http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#overlier-pet2007 or
http://petsymposium.org/2008/hotpets/vrtprsvc.pdf useful in phase two. See
in particular the designs where the introduction point ignores your cell
if you don't provide the right authentication.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5979#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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