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Re: [tor-bugs] #9972 [Tor]: Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.
#9972: Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.
------------------------+------------------------------------
Reporter: mr-4 | Owner: nickm
Type: defect | Status: assigned
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.4.17-rc
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-client 025-triaged
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by asn):
Hm, I still don't see what causes this bug. Especially in the case of a
bridge with no restrictions on its EntryNodes. I will look into this more.
Some notes on branch `bug9972`:
This looks like a forgotten format string:
{{{
- log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "%d entries in guards",
smartlist_len(entry_guards));
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "%d entries in guards after adding enough
EntryNodes");
}}}
I'm also a bit confused by these changes:
{{{
- if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options) &&
+ if (! options->UseBridges &&
}}}
It seems to me that those checks were there, so that if the user has
configured `EntryGuards` we make sure that they are strictly enforced.
With the new checks, it seems that even if the user has configured
`EntryGuards`, if they are less than `num_needed` we will go ahead and add
random entry guards from the consensus. Is this what we want, or am I
misreading the code? I'd say that if a user's configured `EntryGuards` are
not sufficient to bootstrap Tor, Tor should fail closed and abort and ask
the user to tune their `EntryGuards`.
Turning this to `needs_revision` for the format string, and I plan to
review more soon.
I'd like to try to reproduce this. I'm still puzzled by the case of the
single bridge with no entry guard restrictions.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9972#comment:20>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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