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Re: [tor-bugs] #13670 [Tor Browser]: ensure OCSP requests respect URL bar domain isolation

#13670: ensure OCSP requests respect URL bar domain isolation
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:           |      Owner:  arthuredelstein
  arthuredelstein        |     Status:  needs_review
         Type:  defect   |  Milestone:
     Priority:  major    |    Version:
    Component:  Tor      |   Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff38-esr,
  Browser                |  MikePerry201505R, TorBrowserTeam201506R, tbb-5
   Resolution:           |  .0a-highrisk
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:
       Points:           |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:44 mikeperry]:
 > Replying to [comment:42 arthuredelstein]:
 > > Here's a new fixup patch that addresses issues mentioned in comment:38
 and comment:40. I fixed the code in nsHTTPDownloadEvent::Run by prepending
 an "https://"; scheme to the isolation domain.
 > >
 > > https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-
 browser/commit/c95f25a009d421a7cf38e56cc4c6fe83ff43c438
 > >
 > > I tested this patch and confirmed that most OCSP requests are isolated
 to the first party domain. However, some OCSP requests go on the No-First-
 Party circuit, apparently because they are prompted by favicon requests or
 Tor Browser update requests.
 >
 > This last case should be solved bu #16448, right?

 Yes, in my manual tests, it is solved by #16448.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13670#comment:45>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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