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Re: [tor-bugs] #22400 [Core Tor/Tor]: We bootstrap from different primary guards when we start with a non-live consensus and not enough guards in the state file
#22400: We bootstrap from different primary guards when we start with a non-live
consensus and not enough guards in the state file
-----------------------------------------------+---------------------------
Reporter: arma | Owner: nickm
Type: defect | Status:
| needs_review
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.1.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor:
| 0.3.0.7
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-client tor-guard 030-backport | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: 3
Reviewer: asn | Sponsor:
-----------------------------------------------+---------------------------
Comment (by asn):
Patch looks reasonable for what it's trying to do, but I think we now have
two very similar logics: the one we just added, and the one that already
exists in `sampled_guards_update_from_consensus()`:
{{{
// It's important to use only a live consensus here; we don't want to
// make changes based on anything expired or old.
if (gs->type != GS_TYPE_BRIDGE) {
networkstatus_t *ns = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time());
if (! ns) {
log_info(LD_GUARD, "No live consensus; can't update "
"sampled entry guards.");
return;
} else {
log_info(LD_GUARD, "Updating sampled guard status based on received
"
"consensus.");
}
}
}}}
Do we need both checks? If yes, can we functionify them?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22400#comment:15>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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