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Re: [tor-bugs] #17857 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled
#17857: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled
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Reporter: teor | Owner: mikeperry
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_revision
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: rsos, sos, tor-hs | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by teor):
* status: needs_review => needs_revision
Comment:
Replying to [comment:22 mikeperry]:
> Ok, I actually used the torrc options so we can turn these off
independently.
T1. Please use rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(): it does
consistency checks on HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode and
HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. (Also, those options are only referenced
directly in config.c and rendservice.c, and the tests, let's keep it that
way.)
T2. And use rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(), it does
consistency checks on NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED and Tor2webMode.
T3. There's duplicate code like this in two different locations for single
onion and Tor2web:
* `networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "nf_pad_tor2web", 1, 0, 1)`
Please use an abstraction function, so that the defaults are set in one
place.
Some other things to be aware of:
* if a Tor2web client is using Tor2webRendezvousPoints, it will directly
connect to just a few nodes for the rendezvous step (unless they go down).
So Tor2web rendezvous padding is config-dependent. And the stats on it may
be high on just a few relays.
* this code unconditionally disables padding for every Tor2web or single
onion circuit, even if that circuit is a multi-hop circuit. That's
probably ok, because Tor2web makes single hop connections even to HSDirs
(which is a denial of service risk), and Single Onion Services disables
EntryNodes even on its 3-hop HSDir connections.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17857#comment:23>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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