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Re: [tor-bugs] #2697 [Torflow]: Detect exit nodes running 'transparent' HTTP proxies
#2697: Detect exit nodes running 'transparent' HTTP proxies
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Reporter: rransom | Owner: mikeperry
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: critical | Milestone:
Component: Torflow | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by rransom):
Replying to [comment:5 tornewbie]:
> I think he's not the one and only one going to do that ...
That's why I want the exit scanner to use at least a few HTTP proxy
detection techniques.
> I've put all Amunet* family IP range ( 199.48.147.32/28 ) in my
ExcludeExitNodes list since when I saw that different tor check pages ( at
random and not always ) told me I was not using Tor and the IP was
199.48.147.44 ( over which no Amunet family node is running ).
It sounds to me like the Amunet exit nodes are all running on a single
computer with multiple IP addresses, and their operator didn't set
!OutboundBindAddress (or set it to the same value in multiple nodes' torrc
files). What you describe is not necessarily a sign of an upstream HTTP
proxy, and particularly not on a family of exit nodes that we know
contains multiple Tor instances per physical computer.
Please be aware that using !ExcludeExitNodes (especially if you exclude a
significant set of high-bandwidth exits) can harm your anonymity.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2697#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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