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Re: [tor-bugs] #5028 [Ooni]: Tor bridge scanning
#5028: Tor bridge scanning
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Reporter: hellais | Owner: runa
Type: project | Status: assigned
Priority: normal | Milestone: Sponsor F: March 15, 2012
Component: Ooni | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by asn):
A TCP scan on a bridge from .kz would return a false positive, since the
bridge actually gets blocked real-time on the SSL layer.
An SSL scan on a bridge from .cn would return a false positive, since the
bridge would get active-scanned and blocked afterwards.
From discussing this with hellais the past few days, I think this ticket
needs some more thought poured into it. Specifically, I think that the
purpose of this project, the scanning method, and the subset of bridges
to-be scanned could be specified better, before scanning all the bridges
from a single computer in a censored country.
Also, scanning of unpublished bridges should be of interest too.
Also, I think that one of the main questions of this project should be
"What common characteristics do the blocked bridges share, and why are the
non-blocked bridges non-blocked?"
PS: sorry for raiding the ticket
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5028#comment:21>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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