[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #8117 [Tor]: Tor SOCKS handshake makes SOCKS circuit isolation non-functional for many apps
#8117: Tor SOCKS handshake makes SOCKS circuit isolation non-functional for many
apps
-----------------------------------------------+----------------------------
Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.3.25
Keywords: tor-client isolation 023-backport | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
-----------------------------------------------+----------------------------
Comment(by sysrqb):
This works well, at least for a non-broken app. I was initially uncertain
about Tor only respecting socks_prefer_no_auth if NoAuth was send by the
client. I'm wonder if there are any commonly used and Socks5-broken apps
that say they only support u+p if they are configured with a username and
password. If this was the case, then Tor would still reply to use u+p
because NoAuth was not a client-supported method. There's not much Tor can
do in this case, though, if the app doesn't know how to handle the
response.
On a different note, how do you feel about creating isolated circuits for
connections from apps that said they support u+p but Tor responded with
NoAuth because PreferSOCKSNoAuth was set?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8117#comment:16>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs