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Re: [tor-bugs] #15517 [BridgeDB]: BridgeDB considers IPv6 clients in the same /64 to be "in the same subnet"

#15517: BridgeDB considers IPv6 clients in the same /64 to be "in the same subnet"
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  isis     |      Owner:  isis
         Type:  defect   |     Status:  new
     Priority:           |  Milestone:
  critical               |    Version:
    Component:           |   Keywords:  bridgedb-dist, bridge-enumeration,
  BridgeDB               |  ipv6
   Resolution:           |  Parent ID:
Actual Points:           |
       Points:           |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:2 arma]:
 > How about giving different bridges to the ipv6 users? Mapping both ipv4
 and ipv6 users onto the same bridge pool means that whichever strategy the
 attacker finds easier to attack is the one that will defeat that pool.

 That could work. It would mean another set of rings that we'd have to
 fidget with and balance between how much use its getting and how many
 bridges it has in it. I'm worried a bit that we already have too many
 layers of hashrings, because this is currently resulting in too few obfs4
 bridges being spread too thin between too many rings, meaning that
 currently sometimes users can't get obfs4 bridges when they ask for them.

 For now, I would like to at least stop attackers who own a /48 (like me)
 from easily pretending to be 65535 clients and enumerating ''any'' ring
 they are in. You're right that with a separate IPv6 ring, at least they
 wouldn't be able to enumerate the IPv4 one, but they'd still get the whole
 IPv6 one quite easily. Changing it to /32 should make that second problem
 a least a bit more expensive/difficult.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15517#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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