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Re: [tor-bugs] #1297 [Tor Hidden Services]: Update hidden service logic to be more resilient to timeout
#1297: Update hidden service logic to be more resilient to timeout
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Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: rransom
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component: Tor Hidden Services | Version: 0.2.2.10-alpha
Resolution: None | Keywords:
Parent: #2552 | Points:
Actualpoints: |
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Changes (by rransom):
* status: assigned => needs_review
Comment:
Replying to [comment:1 Sebastian]:
> Something I've experience myself was that occasionally a hidden service
would take 120 seconds to time out, but a new request would very quickly
succeed.
This problem is on the client side, not the server side (which this
ticket's description focuses on). The client spends its pre-built
general-purpose circuits somehow (possibly on the descriptor fetch,
possibly on introduction or rendezvous circuits which immediately time out
(I haven't dug thoroughly enough into the source to find out whether this
happens yet)), then all of the rendezvous circuits and introduction
circuits it opens time out; when the user opens a second AP connection
after the first times out, the client has some pre-built circuits ready,
and the introduction and rendezvous attempts succeed before the CBT code
reaps those circuits.
See
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/rransom/tor.git/shortlog/refs/heads/bug1297a
bug1297a] ( `git://git.torproject.org/rransom/tor.git bug1297a` ) for
fixes for some timeout-induced breakage on the client side. I suspect
that this doesn't completely fix #1297 on the client side, and it doesn't
even touch the hidden service side.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1297#comment:7>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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