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Re: [tor-bugs] #2355 [Tor Client]: Change UseBridges to prevent any access attempts of public tor network
#2355: Change UseBridges to prevent any access attempts of public tor network
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Reporter: anonym | Type: defect
Status: needs_review | Priority: major
Milestone: Tor: 0.2.2.x-final | Component: Tor Client
Version: | Keywords:
Parent: | Points:
Actualpoints: |
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Comment(by arma):
Replying to [comment:22 mikeperry]:
> I think this is very important. Our poor configuration options and the
lack of the ability to produce "Bridge Use Only" bundles is endangering
people's lives in Syria, Iran, and elsewhere.
>
> It is very unlikely that new Tor users will configure things safely in
these situations without prior training... They will just run our default
TBBs, hit the firewall, and risk getting arrested for the attempt
(especially if they appear to succeed later).
Mike, can you explain why this is best solved inside Tor?
I could imagine a Vidalia patch too, where it chooses not to Start Tor
until you've answered its popup about bridges.
Said another way, if only Tor changes, how are you planning to make the
user-facing bundles do what you want? And if Vidalia changes, why not
change it to do everything you want?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2355#comment:30>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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