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Re: [tor-bugs] #5460 [Tor Client]: Write proposal(s) to evaluate circuit crypto authentication
#5460: Write proposal(s) to evaluate circuit crypto authentication
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Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: nickm
Type: defect | Status: assigned
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor Client | Version:
Keywords: | Parent: #5456
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by nickm):
Replying to [comment:4 mikeperry]:
> Ondrej pointed out that I2P's one-RTT circuit construction is very
useful for avoiding disclosing the length of your circuit. It might also
be useful for avoiding the per-hop MACs we'd need here.
Mike, Marsh, and I just discussed this a little on IRC. The tricky thing
here is that there aren't a lot of ways to do one-RTT circuit construction
and retain PFS--especially PFS for your path itself!-- unless you're
getting your PFS from key rotation.
We should go through Kate and Goldberg's paper to see if it shows (or
cites!) something we could use, but it's not obvious to me that it's a
great idea right now.
(Also, circuit creation is ''not'' what this ticket is about: this ticket
is about handling relay cells once circuits are established.)
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5460#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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