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Re: [tor-bugs] #5707 [Tor]: Use end to end stream timing data to further prune circuits
#5707: Use end to end stream timing data to further prune circuits
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Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: mikeperry
Type: enhancement | Status: assigned
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: SponsorZ performance needs-research tor-client | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by arma):
All the researchers doing Tor anonymity analysis get really agitated when
we add new path selection approaches that aren't based on global
information. And assuming the congestion is inside the network, where
you're connecting from shouldn't make a big impact. And finally, all these
"local not global" approaches raise complex questions about an adversary
who influences a target user's opinions to influence her paths.
So the first question is, how well can we approximate your above plans
with probers (a la bwauths)? And the followup question is, how much
information do we need to put into e.g. the consensus for it to work?
Also, you should know that Micah Sherr's 'virtual coordinate system' plan
has some code somewhere, though I have so far failed to publically pry it
out of them.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5707#comment:10>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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