Re: [tor-bugs] #11973 [Tor]: Should relays stop making unencrypted directory connections?

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#11973: Should relays stop making unencrypted directory connections?
------------------------+------------------------------
     Reporter:  nickm   |      Owner:
         Type:  defect  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
    Component:  Tor     |    Version:
   Resolution:          |   Keywords:  needs-proposal
Actual Points:          |  Parent ID:
       Points:          |
------------------------+------------------------------

Comment (by bburley):

 I have a better understanding now of the reasoning behind using direct or
 encrypted sessions when communicating with the authorities. (1) Cost of
 server resources, and (2) protecting information believed to not need
 protecting.

 I don't know the value of (1), but I do believe that removing an
 additional way of someone determining you are operating as part of the Tor
 infrastructure in valuable. Yes, someone can enumerate the Tor
 infrastructure by installing a client. That is one way to get information
 if they are looking for who is running Tor nodes. Someone trying to figure
 out what a particular server is running, not looking for Tor specifically,
 is a different attack/angle. Not encrypting that info allows someone to
 determine a server is running Tor when they weren't looking for it in the
 first place, but now they know.

 Would it be reasonable have an option created to turn this capability
 on/off?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11973#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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