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Re: [tor-bugs] #15979 [Tor Browser]: consider changing order of nodes in "Tor circuit for this site" UI
#15979: consider changing order of nodes in "Tor circuit for this site" UI
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: tbb-team
Type: enhancement | Status: closed
Priority: minor | Milestone:
Component: Tor Browser | Version:
Resolution: wontfix | Keywords: tbb-circuit-display
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by cypherpunks):
Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
> I am not convinced of this idea mainly as it disrupts the reading flow:
you read from top to down which nicely corresponds to the fact that you
are constructing the Tor circuit from your local computer: your browser is
your starting point, then the Tor nodes are coming and then your requests
are dispatched to your destination.
You are assuming that users will try to parse the circuit display like a
block of text, i.e. read it from top to bottom; my suggestion was made
under the assumption that they would parse it like a route plan or map*
(and based on my own experience of doing a double-take when first seeing
the circuit display).
I don't know which of these assumptions is correct for the majority of
users, and I don't intend to argue the point further, but in future it
would be nice to see usability issues in Tor Browser resolved based on
usability testing, and not based on one developer's unfounded assumption.
*another comparison would be car sat-nav displays where the user's current
position is displayed at the bottom and the destination at the top.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15979#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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