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Re: [tor-bugs] #15744 [Tor]: Is 16384 introductions a sane limit for IP rotation?
#15744: Is 16384 introductions a sane limit for IP rotation?
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Reporter: dgoulet | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: SponsorR, tor-hs
Actual Points: | Parent ID: #15714
Points: |
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Comment (by asn):
Some thoughts on graphs:
- If we want more data for this ticket, we are mainly interested in how
the the histogram of introductions per circuit looks like.
- We should use the lifetime information to figure out info on the churn
of hidden services. For this, the histogram of the lifetime of circuits
should be helpful. The idea, is that if we see many ultra-volatile hidden
services, maybe we should make our protocols more friendly to this use
case.
- Another, more experimental graph, would be how the value of each bin of
the histogram changes over time. I imagine this would not be very
revealing, but maybe it reveals some information on the edge-cases we
observed. Like, maybe ultra busy hidden services only appear on weekends
or something. Unfortunately, we probably don't have a big enough data set
to make useful observations from this.
- Of course, if we had the non-aggregated stats, we could also check how
long did 16384+ intro circuits last. This could help us understand if such
circuits are getting DoSed (they lasted 5 minutes), or they just see
regular client activity. But it's ok that we don't have this info.
tl;dr The histograms of both data sets are enough for now.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15744#comment:11>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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