[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #18809 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle linked connections better during bootstrap
#18809: Handle linked connections better during bootstrap
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: teor | Owner: teor
Type: defect | Status:
Priority: Medium | merge_ready
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Milestone: Tor:
Severity: Normal | 0.2.8.x-final
Keywords: must-fix-before-028-rc, | Version: Tor:
TorCoreTeam201605, review-group-1, must- | 0.2.8.1-alpha
fix-before-0283 | Resolution:
Parent ID: | Actual Points: 4
Reviewer: andrea | Points: 3
| Sponsor:
| SponsorS-can
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by nickm):
In connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
* I hate making this function more complex. It is already far too
complex. But I won't hold off the patch for that.
Here's a case I needed to think about:
{{{
+ * As soon as we have received a consensus, return 0, even if we don't
have
+ * enough certificates to validate it. */
}}}
Suppose that a fallback gives us a bogus consensus whose certificates are
all bad. When will we notice, throw the consensus away, and try to fetch
another one? Having a comment that explains the process here would ease
my mind, and the mind of the next person who tries to read the code. :)
Merging and applying roger's spelling fixes.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18809#comment:33>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs