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Re: [tor-bugs] #19124 [Core Tor/Tor]: Shared Random and Half-Hour Consensuses
#19124: Shared Random and Half-Hour Consensuses
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Reporter: teor | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: closed
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution: not a bug
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #16943 | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by dgoulet):
* status: new => closed
* resolution: => not a bug
Comment:
Yes, those are simple counters. When no consensus is available, we use the
InitialInterval so our "update state" function is called twice in the hour
and the counter is incremented. Those counters have nothing to do with any
checks on about which round we are in. The code doesn't do something like
`if (n_commit_rounds > 12) { change phase }`.
They are purely used for logging purposes so we can keep track of where we
are between commit and reveal and time. Tests use those to know where the
subsystem is at. Also, this is why you don't see a big gap in numbers in
the first log output above.
Authority should recover if it ever has an offset in the phases because
it's lined up to the time and voting interval. So if an authority would
jump into the reveal phase by mistake, it will start the commit phase with
everyone else at the right time (if all dirauth are synced ofc).
Re-open if you see a bug or potential issues that we can fix. I'm closing
this one and let discussion happen on IRC/mailing list if more information
is needed but for now I don't see a bug?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19124#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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