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Re: [tor-bugs] #3028 [Core Tor/Tor]: META: Support non-clique topologies on the network (was: FascistFirewall for tor relays)



#3028: META: Support non-clique topologies on the network
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 Reporter:  tagnaq                    |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Low                       |      Milestone:  Tor: very long
                                      |  term
Component:  Core Tor/Tor              |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                    |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
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Changes (by nickm):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket asked for a way to have a relay that can't connect to other
 relays on some particular port.  But that's just one case of relaxing
 Tor's clique assumption, which is also required for relays that don't have
 IPv4 addresses, and relays that can't reach a subset of other relays.
 Further, we'll need to remove the clique topology assumption in order to
 scale to a large number of relays without requiring the number of sockets
 used on each relay to grow proportionally to the size of the network.

 We don't actually know how to do this safely right now; it will take a
 pretty big amount of design work.  Naive solutions have the problem that
 they would make it easier for an adversary to force users into compromised
 paths by manipulating the network topology.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3028#comment:5>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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