Re: [tor-bugs] #30541 [Applications/Tor Browser]: webgl readPixels FP entropy

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#30541: webgl readPixels FP entropy
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  Thorin                               |          Owner:  tbb-
                                                 |  team
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High                            |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser             |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,                  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R, GeorgKoppen201905       |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Medium => Very High
 * cc: acat, mcs, brade (added)
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-fingerprinting-os => tbb-
     fingerprinting, TorBrowserTeam201905R, GeorgKoppen201905


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 Thorin]:
 > Stock standard: I never play with the slider, as I'm looking for worst
 case scenarios.

 Okay, yes, going with the worst case scenario is a good idea. However,
 using the Tor Browser default was *not* the worst case scenario
 fingerprinting-wise which we support (however, I agree, it should have
 been). The worst case scenario here was someone allowing to run WebGL via
 click-to-play. That would have triggered this bug already as it is not a
 new one. In fact, Arthur has even pointed out that issue in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1422890#c3 a while back.

 This bug has a cautionary tale to tell (and hopefully some lessons for us
 to learn):

 1) It's a bad idea to use the security slider for privacy means as it
 makes the result harder to analyze. I've been holding that opinion for a
 while now but this bug is a strong example for this problem: It seems in
 part we relied on WebGL being click-to-play to not escalate an underlying
 privacy issue (we did not even create a ticket for the `readPixels()`
 issue until yesterday). Tests until up to 8.5a11 showed we were good and
 then 8.5a11 adjusted the *security* settings for WebGL.

 2) We did not file the bug right away to have it on our radar. I guess
 when working on #16005 it would have been a good time. Or once
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1422890#c3 came up. There is
 #26198 but that would likely not have caught this issue.

 3) While we put the final fix out in an alpha which gave 4 weeks for
 finding this issue, that was not enough. There are tests like
 https://ghacksuserjs.github.io/TorZillaPrint/TorZillaPrint.html#canvas and
 folks are using those frequently, but we should be able to do better here
 by adding a respective test to our own test suite.

 Anyway, here comes a patch for review: `bug_30541_v2`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_30541_v2&id=299097102f6f90757e9b10a21ad34e0a11a640f8).

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30541#comment:5>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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