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Re: [tor-bugs] #1880 [Tor Relay]: Enhanced Security Suggestion
#1880: Enhanced Security Suggestion
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Reporter: forever | Type: enhancement
Status: closed | Priority: normal
Milestone: | Component: Tor Relay
Version: | Resolution: not a bug
Keywords: | Parent:
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Changes (by nickm):
* status: new => closed
* resolution: => not a bug
Comment:
This is an open research question, and out-of-scope for the Tor
bugtracker. If you're interested in chasing it down, you could start with
some of the traffic analysis and anonymity papers at
http://freehaven.net/anonbib/ . See also the padding-related FAQ entry at
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#Youshouldsendpaddingsoitsmoresecure.
: the same logic applies to random delays.
The short version is for every studied means of adding random delays or
traffic padding to low-latency anonymity network, either it requires so
much delay/padding that it isn't deployable for low-latency traffic on a
volunteer-operated network, or it doesn't actually delay attackers long
enough to be useful, or both. Whether this is true of all traffic
padding/delay schemes or not is an open research question.
Also, the question about packet sizes suggests that you could take some
time to read the spec or the design paper; both explain that Tor doesn't
send variable-sized packets of user data.
Closing for now: if anybody solves the research questions here and find a
means of padding/delay that ''does'' resist attackers well on a low-
latency network, we should reconsider.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1880#comment:1>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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