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Re: [tor-bugs] #4390 [Tor Bridge]: The rotation of the TLS context can act as a fingerprint for bridges
#4390: The rotation of the TLS context can act as a fingerprint for bridges
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Reporter: asn | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Tor Bridge | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by asn):
This is also necessary for:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2011-November/003061.html
Do you people have any opinions on the new validity duration of the
certificates?
The scheme described in the above link, would enjoy long-term
certificates, because every time a certificate expires the bridge operator
has to manually re-propagate its fingerprint.
Do you have any ideas on a good validity duration? Or do you have any
ideas on a bad validity duration?
Rotating certificates and keys is good practice, but in the case of SSL
the Ephemeral DH ciphers guarantee PFS. In any case, if a relay gets
rooted, They already get the identity key which doesn't have an expiration
date.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4390#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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