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[tor-bugs] #4570 [Tor Bridge]: Implement certificate start time fuzzing and serial number covert channel (part of proposal 179)

#4570: Implement certificate start time fuzzing and serial number covert channel
(part of proposal 179)
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  asn         |          Owner:       
     Type:  defect      |         Status:  new  
 Priority:  normal      |      Milestone:       
Component:  Tor Bridge  |        Version:       
 Keywords:              |         Parent:  #3972
   Points:              |   Actualpoints:       
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 This ticket is for tracking the implementation of certificate start time
 fuzzing and serial number covert channel.

 Jake implemented both of these in his prop179 branch.

 wrt the serial number thing, if we decide to allow users to input their
 own TLS certificates, the serial number covert channel will get poluted. I
 think it's time to think if we really need '''this''' covert channel, or
 if we care that we will get false positives with user-specific
 certificates.

 For link protocol version negotiation, we have the VERSIONS cell. We might
 '''need''' a covert channel '''on''' the SSL handshake, if we need to
 negotiate the link protocol version before the Tor protocol. In which
 cases do we need such a '''visible''' covert channel?

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4570>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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