[tor-bugs] #13642 [Tor]: Implement offline encrypted master keys for Ed25519 identities

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#13642: Implement offline encrypted master keys for Ed25519 identities
-------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  nickm        |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Component:  Tor          |        Version:
 Keywords:               |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:               |         Points:
-------------------------+------------------------------------
 The ed25519 identity key proposal is written so that master identity keys
 are used only to certify medium-term signing keys, and medium-term signing
 keys are used to sign everything else.

 To implement this on top of my branch for #12498, I'd suggest the
 following interface:


   * Have a 'tor --encrypt-master-key' command that you can run while a Tor
 server is _not_ running.  It should prompt for a password, generate a new
 master key, and encrypt it with the crypto_pwbox functionality.  It should
 have an option that says where to store the master key.  It should refuse
 to run if the master key is already present.  It should have an option to
 change the passphrase.

   * Have a 'tor --new-signing-key' command that generates a new signing
 key and certificate for our master key.  It should take a number of days
 that the signing key should be value, with a default around 30 days.  It
 shouldn't require that the Tor server not be running.  It should have an
 option that says where to store the signing keys and certificates.

   * Every command that takes a password should:
     * Use the standard safety features for reading passwords securely from
 the command line.  (There should be a wrapper function for doing this
 across different platforms in src/common.)
     * Have an option that specifies an fd on which a password will be
 provided.
     * Have documented error codes that can be used for shell scripts.
     * Call tor_mlockall() before doing anything.
     * Have a --no-passphrase option that uses an empty string for the
 passphrase.

   * Have a running Tor server check for a new signing key periodically,
 and on sighup.

   * Have a running Tor server warn the user periodically when the signing
 key certificate is going to expire soon.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13642>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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