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[tor-bugs] #17625 [Tor]: Reduce initial and ongoing RendPostPeriod for RSOS

#17625: Reduce initial and ongoing RendPostPeriod for RSOS
-----------------------------+--------------------------------
     Reporter:  teor         |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium       |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
     Severity:  Normal       |   Keywords:
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:  #17178
       Points:               |    Sponsor:
-----------------------------+--------------------------------
 Initial descriptor uploads

 Hidden services hide their start times by uploading their first descriptor
 after:
 `now + rendinitialpostdelay + crypto_rand_int(2*rendpostperiod);`
 which is currently 30 + rand(2*600) seconds minimum.

 A RSOS doesn't need to hide its startup time, but should avoid a
 thundering herd. So we could change it to:
 `now + rendinitialpostdelay + crypto_rand_int(1*rendpostperiod);`
 (Or perhaps some fraction of RendPostPeriod, or perhaps a constant like 60
 seconds.)

 Ongoing descriptor uploads

 If a RSOS site implements failover or high availability, it may need to
 post descriptors more often than the current minimum RendPostPeriod of 10
 minutes.

 For example, if a RSOS goes down, and another instance should replace it
 within 30 seconds, it would need:
 600/30 = 20 redundant instances

 Instead, if we want a small number of instances, say 4:
 30 * 4 = 120 second RendPostPeriod.
 (This also helps with the initial post period above.)

 This is perhaps mitigated by multiple HSDirs, with some having descriptors
 from one replica, and some from the other. (But this is not guaranteed -
 one replica could have just uploaded all the HSDirs, then gone down.)

 This also needs a proposal update.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17625>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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