Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06
-----------------------------------------+--------------------------
 Reporter:  dcf                          |          Owner:
     Type:  project                      |         Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium                       |      Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                       |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz          |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                               |         Points:
 Reviewer:                               |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------------------+--------------------------

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:1 dcf]:
 >  * A first segment of 1­–15 bytes doesn't work.
 >  * A first segment of 16 bytes works.
 >  * A first segment of 16 bytes works also for unobfuscated Tor TLS.
 >  * A first segment of 17 bytes works.
 >  * A first segment of 32 bytes works.
 >  * A first segment of 64 bytes is inconclusive (see comment:8)
 >  * A first segment of 128 bytes doesn't work.

 On 2016-11-11 kzblocked reported that something had changed on at least
 some of the DPI boxes in Kazakhstan. A first segment of 16 to 32 bytes
 doesn't work anymore. The detection seems to happen more often now,
 sometimes even before a Tor circuit is built.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20348#comment:34>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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