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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: gk | Owner: tbb-
| team
Type: defect | Status:
| needs_revision
Priority: Very High | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, | Actual Points:
TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2 |
Parent ID: #26693 | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by gk):
Replying to [comment:17 sisbell]:
> Replying to [comment:16 sysrqb]:
>
> > Replying to [comment:15 gk]:
> >
> >
> > > I am not so sure, though, that not signing it is not a problem. How
are we testing our final result on Android devices without *any* signing?
(We don't have that problem on desktop platforms as signing requirements
can get disabled if they are existing at all)
> > >
> > >
> >
> > Ah. Good point. The unsigned-unaligned apk should be (as the name
implies) not signed. But when building Fennec with Mozilla's build system,
they produce an additional apk that is signed with a
[https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#debug-mode debug
signing key]. It looks like that happens in [https://gitweb.torproject.org
/tor-browser.git/tree/config/android-common.mk?h=tor-
browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1#n11 config/android-common.mk], calling
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
browser.git/tree/mobile/android/debug_sign_tool.py?h=tor-
browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1#n11 mobile/android/debug_sign_tool.py]. I think we
can use this, too.
>
> We have different types of signing under consideration:
>
> * v1: Android 6 and earlier jarsigning
> * v2: with signing block (Android 7) :
https://source.android.com/security/apksigning/v2
> * v3: with key rotation (Android 9):
https://source.android.com/security/apksigning/v3
>
> It looks like mozilla is using v1 for debug, this is the only case we
need to consider for the debug build. For production level signing, we
should consider looking into v3 (perhaps mozilla is already using v3
signing?)
Yes, but for the outcome in our tor-browser-build whatever Mozilla is
doing is enough (e.g. v1 if we get that in our current firefox build).
It's just for testing on devices that our code does what it should (and
only that :) ). The real signing for release is done later, outside of our
tor-browser-build environment.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28144#comment:18>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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