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Re: [tor-bugs] #28372 [Applications/Tor Browser]: determine if onvisibilitychange is a fingerprinting vector

#28372: determine if onvisibilitychange is a fingerprinting vector
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 Reporter:  mcs                          |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  defect                       |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                       |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser     |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                       |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                               |         Points:
 Reviewer:                               |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by onvisibilitychange):

 Replying to [ticket:28372 mcs]:
 > In Firefox 56, Mozilla added support for onvisibilitychange. See:
 > https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Web/API/Document/onvisibilitychange
 > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1333912
 Just a more standard way to detect visibility change. See:
 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/898cac60f7c3
 > We should think about whether this introduces any new fingerprinting
 risks.
 Linkability risks, a bit. Maybe. But what fingerprint do you mean?
 > The following mentions a prerender state which we (mcs and brade) do not
 fully understand:
 > https://w3c.github.io/page-visibility/#privacy-security
 It is a topic for another ticket, but see https://w3c.github.io/resource-
 hints/#security-and-privacy

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28372#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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