Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
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 Reporter:  arthuredelstein           |          Owner:  JeremyRand
     Type:  defect                    |         Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium                    |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                    |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTesm201911R     |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by JeremyRand):

 > 2 of the public ElectrumX Namecoin servers are currently down for
 maintenance. Since Namecoin connects to multiple servers simultaneously to
 improve performance, the performance of this patch will be degraded until
 those servers come back online. It still works fine and isn't particularly
 annoying, but there *will* be some higher-than-typical latency while we're
 waiting for those servers to come back online. (It would be awesome if the
 Tor community decides to set up some additional ElectrumX Namecoin
 servers.)

 1 of those 2 servers has completed maintenance and is back online as of
 yesterday, so that should yield a performance bump for anyone testing
 these patches.

 On another note: in the hypothetical event that the patches in this ticket
 pass review and are merged, my recommendation would be to time the merge
 to coincide with a blogpost, so that users of the Nightly builds are
 informed of what the changes are.  Otherwise, there might be unnecessary
 confusion by users who observe a bunch of Namecoin code being merged to
 tor-browser-build (or who observe its presence in the Nightly binaries)
 and aren't sure what the scope of it is (e.g. it's important that users
 know that the code is disabled by default, so that they don't think
 they're being exposed to new attack surface without their opt-in consent).
 I'm happy to contribute to such a blogpost if/when we reach the point
 where it's relevant.  Of course, if you strongly prefer to merge without a
 blogpost and worry about doing a blogpost later, you're welcome to do so.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30558#comment:14>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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