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Re: [tor-bugs] #32562 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_ADD credentials to be made permanent
#32562: Allow ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_ADD credentials to be made permanent
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: asn | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status:
| needs_review
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.4.3.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-hs, tbb-usability, ux-team, hs- | Actual Points: 1.2
auth, network-team-roadmap-september, |
042-deferred-20190918 |
Parent ID: #14389 | Points: 2
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
| Sponsor27-must
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Changes (by asn):
* status: new => needs_review
* actualpoints: => 1.2
Comment:
OK here we go:
little-t-tor branch: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1563
torspec branch: https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/94
Some comments and changes from the original trajectory:
- Adding a Permanent credential requires the `ClientOnionAuthDir` torrc
option to be set, and also the directory to be already created. When this
is done, permanent credentials will be created as files within that
directory.
- Nicknames have been completely ditched because of the huge PITA that it
would be to add them to the non-forward-compatible client auth file format
(as described by the corresponding commit messages both in torspec and
tor). In the future we can consider adding them but that would be even
more work. For now, this could be handled in the TB layer if needed.
- The REMOVE control port command will also remove the corresponding
client auth files if they are permanent and they exist.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32562#comment:1>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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