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Re: [tor-bugs] #3792 [Tor bundles/installation]: TBB takes too long to start up
#3792: TBB takes too long to start up
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Reporter: phobos | Owner: mikeperry
Type: enhancement | Status: assigned
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Tor bundles/installation | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by arma):
Replying to [comment:1 mikeperry]:
> For #2, Tor should be creating test circuits using an existing stable or
fallback consensus without the need to wait to download a very fresh one
just to test network access. I thought there was some form of ticket for a
long-term/fallback consensus, but I cannot find it.
See #572.
But what do you mean by 'test circuits'? Tor makes circuits to use them,
and it should not make circuits with an old consensus -- see also #2878.
And it shouldn't indicate 100% bootstrapped until it has a circuit that
can be used.
> For #4, Tor should be pre-creating a circuit suitable for check in all
cases. I believe it already does this?
If you are unlucky enough to choose two exit relays that exit to 80 but
not 443, then you won't have a preemptive circuit available. I guess we
could kickstart ourselves with 80 *and* 443 -- somebody should sort out if
that would give us more expected preemptive circuits or if it would be
about the same number in practice.
> In any case, we should perhaps also have the option to use the fallback
consensus for actual circuits while Tor downloads a fresh consensus, or at
least to be able to use it for check.
Building circuits using relays and keys from n days ago, where n is
something your adversaries might find interesting about you, seems like a
bad move here.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3792#comment:16>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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