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Re: [tor-bugs] #2003 [Tor Relay]: Hibernation Soft and Hard Limits Reached Simultaneously

#2003: Hibernation Soft and Hard Limits Reached Simultaneously
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  BarkerJr   |          Owner:  Sebastian         
     Type:  defect     |         Status:  assigned          
 Priority:  major      |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor Relay  |        Version:  Tor: unspecified  
 Keywords:             |         Parent:                    
   Points:             |   Actualpoints:                    
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------

Comment(by Sebastian):

 Just chatted with nick about this. The consensus seemed to be that we
 should be smart about opening ports when we're root and will later drop
 privileges. I'm identifying these cases:

 We don't have accounting enabled: Open ports right away.

 We have accounting configured and (we're not root, or we're not dropping
 privileges, or we're not trying to open a low port): Let's delay opening
 ports, because we can still do it when we're ready to parse the state file
 and see if we should've been hibernating or not.

 We have accounting configured and we're root and we want to drop
 privileges and we're opening a low port: Open ports now. The user already
 has a warning in their log telling them that if we ever go into
 hibernation, their relay will likely not be able to reopen ports. In this
 case, we will want a mechanism in place that doesn't clobber the state
 file with information that we just started hibernating when we've
 successfully parsed the state file and learned that we should've been
 hibernating all along, so that when the user fixes their configuration
 they still have a sane state file.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2003#comment:37>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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