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Re: [tor-bugs] #2681 [Tor]: brainstorm ways to let Tor clients use yesterday's consensus more safely
#2681: brainstorm ways to let Tor clients use yesterday's consensus more safely
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Reporter: arma | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: dirauth-dos-resistance proposal-needed MikePerry201210d tor-client | Parent: #2664
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by mikeperry):
Hrmm. I tried to ponder these imponderables, but I failed to both do that
and get my other proposals done on time. Can we just set the limit at 3
days and call this 'small-feature' (or make a different ticket for that
and call that one 'small-feature')?
Otherwise, once we start talking about checking consensus on the most
current/correct consensus, we probably want something that tries to do
multipath consensus hash verification. That seems like a /real/ proposal,
as it would solve both this and other, perhaps more interesting attacks
(such as https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
dev/2012-October/004063.html). One simple idea: Ask the k of fallback
mirrors from #572 their current consensus hash, and make sure they all
agree. They should all be authenticated by their identity key in the
source code. Seems like this is a separate ticket for sure, though.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2681#comment:9>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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