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Re: [tor-bugs] #7098 [Tor]: Add safe-cookie authentication to Extended ORPort and TransportControlPort
#7098: Add safe-cookie authentication to Extended ORPort and TransportControlPort
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Reporter: asn | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: tor-bridge | Parent: #4773
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by asn):
Replying to [comment:3 rransom]:
> Replying to [comment:2 rransom]:
> > If you can use e.g. a 64-byte file with a 32-byte constant header for
your protocols, you can use something a little simpler and nicer (perhaps
using the 32-byte secret from the file as the HMAC key, and putting the
protocol-identifying and âclient-to-serverâ-versus-âserver-to-clientâ
static string(s) in the HMAC message).
>
> On actual thought, if you put a header in your cookie file, you can just
use it as a plain client-to-server password. You wouldn't have to worry
about breaking other systems that happen to use 32-byte secret keys, and
the âsafe cookieâ protocol doesn't defend against MITMs anyway.
>
> Someone should figure out and specify what security properties these
protocols actually need.
If we are to create a new protocol, maybe we should keep the security
properties of the safe-cookie protocol. That is:
+ authenticate client and server based on the contents of a file on the
local filesystem
+ don't leak file contents to potential attackers
+ be resistant to cross-protocol attacks
Similarly, we should probably not try to solve the
integrity/confidentiality problem and instead let an SSL layer handle it,
if there is a need.
If we add a header to the cookie file, what do you imagine having in that
header? Maybe the type of cookie; what else?
Also, is there a reason for the cookie to be of a specific size, or can it
be the rest of the cookie file after the header? We are going to send it
hashed on the wire anyway.
As for the protocol we might want to keep the safe-cookie protocol, but
change it aesthetically and make it easier to parse. The safe-cookie
design seems solid and resembles the HTTP digest authentication.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7098#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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