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Re: [tor-bugs] #7141 [Censorship analysis]: How is Pars Online blocking Tor?
#7141: How is Pars Online blocking Tor?
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Reporter: phw | Owner: phw
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Censorship analysis | Version:
Keywords: dpi, censorship, block, iran | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by cda):
After several attempts to investigate this issue, I am unable to reproduce
this ticket currently. I would suggest that there is a significant need
for more detailed information on what part of the Pars network these
reports are coming from and what the user experiences.
'''Is this type of block limited to Pars Online?'''
I was able to bootstrap a clean installation of Tor from within Iran
yesterday. While I have been led to believe from discussions and
historical examples that most DPI occurs at AS12880, the international
gateway, it does appear evident from recent government RFQs that they are
interested in moving this administration to the ISP level. I have now
arranged a server with Pars and am attempting to reproduce -- without luck
so far.
Three notes:
* There is no significant change in the number of users directly
connecting from Iran under metrics[1]. ParsOnline is something akin to the
Comcast of Iran, and disruptions in the connectivity would be fairly
evident.
* There have been a few number of complaints regarding HTTPS disruption on
social media and elsewhere since the unblocking of Google, but these have
been hard to pin down and nonspecific to Tor.
* If there is active probing, we should setup a bridge with a FQDN,
trigger a probe and watch for connections.
* It would be useful to clarify the manner of the disruption the user is
experiencing: are they able to stay connected to a bridge for a limited
amount of time or unable to create a circuit at all? In the China example
wasn't there queuing on probes and thus a few minutes of access?
I'm certainly not dismissing the ticket, it's just difficult find data at
this moment.
[1] https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-
users&start=2012-10-04&end=2012-10-20&country=ir&events=points&dpi=72
#direct-users
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7141#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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