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[tor-bugs] #10024 [Tor]: Close and open sockets on IP change, tracking
#10024: Close and open sockets on IP change, tracking
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Reporter: grarpamp | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.3.25
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
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For hosts that have dynamic/roaming/dhcp/manual IP changes, is there
a controller toggle that will cause Tor to shut down all external
TCP/UDP connections and state... and then start fresh ones upon the
user toggling Tor back up after an IP change? Seems that
without that, having TCP/UDP retransmit could lead to flow and finer
(seq num, etc) matching to the user's former IP. It wouldn't
necessarily have to change the guards, but that could be an extended
option.
eg: Is there anything to be done for the Tor instance itself to not
be trackable across an IP change?
If so, is monitoring the interface using some OS provided interface API
possible versus a dhcp/user driven controller toggle? Note multiple
stacks,
multiple interfaces, secondary addresses, and vm's etc.
DHCP's unpredictable IP changes and complex state machine / scripts
would make dhcp hard for the typical user to hook into.
A controller toggle would still be needed anyway for those who
manually change their IP.
There may be some small network or client/server benefit to maintaining
things like descriptors in core as opposed to just restarting Tor.
And should this tie in to sighup actions?
I think this may have been discussed recently, if so just pull
from and close this.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10024>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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