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Re: [tor-bugs] #13296 [Tor]: Drop or replace turtles

#13296: Drop or replace turtles
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     Reporter:  atagar  |      Owner:
         Type:  defect  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  major   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
    Component:  Tor     |    Version:
   Resolution:          |   Keywords:
Actual Points:          |  Parent ID:
       Points:          |
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Comment (by micah):

 At one point we discussed the overall imbalance of DirAuths in North
 America and Europe. This disproportionate number in a particular network
 geography results in heavier weighting for exits that are measured by
 those DirAuths as having good network connectivity. Those DirAuths will
 favor exits that are closer to them as having "better" bandwidth, than
 those far away. As an example, I had an exit in Cambodia that was on a
 100mbit/sec connection, but because the DirAuths were so far away their
 measurements resulted in that exit being weighted much lower and thus the
 amount of traffic it served was significantly less than it could do
 (something like 2-5mbit/sec). This seems less than ideal, especially if we
 want to increase the usability of tor in areas of the world other than N.
 America/Europe.

 I think having specific DirAuth criteria are important, but developing an
 overall strategy for strategic placement seems important as well. As the
 authority-policy that arma details, "It's good when authorities are not
 all in the same country." - I'd argue that this should be expanded beyond
 nation/state boundaries and consider network geography as a criteria as
 well.

 On another note, I think that Riseup could offer to host a DirAuth, either
 in Hong Kong, possibly in Cambodia, or in Seattle.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13296#comment:7>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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