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Re: [tor-bugs] #17254 [Tor]: Scalable HSes by splitting intro/rendezvous
#17254: Scalable HSes by splitting intro/rendezvous
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Reporter: TvdW | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_revision
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-hs | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: medium
Sponsor: SponsorR |
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Comment (by teor):
Replying to [comment:8 nickm]:
> Comments on the spec branch:
> * I really don't like sending private keys around like this. Is
there any way to avoid it?
I discussed an alternative design with TvdW, where the introduction side
decrypts the blob using the introduction key, then hands off the decrypted
fields to the rendezvous side. This avoids sending the key, so if the
decrypted fields are exposed, only that rendezvous is affected. The
tradeoff is increased decryption load on the introduction side.
I think this change is worth it for the security improvement.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17254#comment:11>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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