Re: [tor-bugs] #20262 [Core Tor/Tor]: Onion services startup time always gets revealed

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#20262: Onion services startup time always gets revealed
-----------------------------------------------+---------------------------
 Reporter:  twim                               |          Owner:  twim
     Type:  defect                             |         Status:
                                               |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium                             |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                               |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                       |        Version:
 Severity:  Major                              |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, research, review-group-11  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                                     |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                     |        Sponsor:  SponsorR-
                                               |  can
-----------------------------------------------+---------------------------

Comment (by twim):

 Replying to [comment:15 asn]:
 > I handle dozens of trac tickets every week. The fact that #20262 and
 #20082 change the exact same part of the codebase for different reasons
 and are being developed at the same time, confuses me _a lot_ since I
 can't remember what's the rationale for each change and which ticket I
 should consult.
 > All in all, I feel like the security rationale for this bugfix is
 sprinkled over two different trac tickets and a mailing list thread, and
 this makes it very hard to understand why the changes are as is. Also the
 code patches seem more complex than they need to be and a bit hard to
 follow.

 Sorry for leaving this ticket as `needs_review` because it supposed to be
 based on the code after fixing `rend_consider_services_upload()` code in
 #20082. This one and #20082 were closely related in the beginning but
 after it all bifurcated due to the fact that there are two purposes of
 initial post delay:
   * (part of #20082) Unlink multiple onion services running on the same
 tor instance by not uploading all the descriptors at the same time
 (following spec)
   * (#20262) Obfuscate/hide exact startup time in `[0:2*RendPostPeriod]`.
 It should be an optional feature. That's why there is torrc option here.

 >   And talking about threats, if we don't insert a delay, who is the
 attacker here? Who can actually link the multiple HS instances? Their
 descriptors will go to different HSDirs most probably, so it's probably
 not the HSDIr. Who is the attacker? I still have not seen a proper
 security analysis here...

 It's the purpose of #20082 and this discussion should be done there (see
 above).

 Sorry for the mess. :\

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20262#comment:17>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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